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INTRODUCTION 
 Although Defendant shot the victim four times, the victim survived 
and identified Defendant from a photo lineup.  Defendant’s fingerprints were 
also on the magazine of the gun that fired the bullets.   
 I.  After Defendant was charged, Defendant’s counsel requested a pre-
trial competency evaluation because Defendant allegedly appeared to be 
unable to understand the proceedings and make rational decisions.  After two 
court-appointed psychologists examined Defendant and found that he was 
competent, counsel stipulated to Defendant’s competency.   
 Defendant complains that this was ineffective assistance.  But 
Defendant cannot carry his burden to prove ineffectiveness because he offers 
no evidence of prejudice—a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s 
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stipulation he would have been found incompetent.  There can be no 
prejudice here for two reasons:  (1) the competency evaluations conclusively 
resolved counsel’s initial concerns; and (2) Defendant’s performance during 
his police interview and his plea colloquy to a bifurcated charge supported 
the evaluators’ unequivocal conclusions that Defendant was competent.  For 
these same reasons, Defendant cannot prove deficient performance.  
Reasonable counsel could choose to stipulate to Defendant’s competency 
after both evaluators found Defendant competent and the record 
overwhelmingly supported that conclusion. 
 Defendant appears to challenge his convictions for both attempted 
murder and possession of a firearm by a restricted person.   But the trial court 
bifurcated the firearm-possession charge and Defendant pled guilty to it after 
the jury convicted him of attempted murder.  Defendant therefore can 
challenge only his attempted murder conviction in this appeal because his 
guilty plea waived any non-jurisdictional defect in his firearm-possession 
conviction. 
 II.  Defendant also complains that his counsel was ineffective for not 
consulting with one of the evaluators.  But Defendant cannot prove this claim 
because it depends on extra-record evidence.  Defendant seeks a rule 23B 
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remand to augment the record, but this Court should deny remand for the 
reasons explained in the accompanying response to Defendant’s motion. 
 III.  The cumulative-error doctrine is inapplicable because a single 
prejudicial error—had Defendant proved one—would entitle him to relief.  
Regardless, Defendant has not shown any error. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
 1.  Defendant demonstrated his competency during his police 
interview, two competency evaluations, and a plea colloquy.  The record 
contains no evidence of incompetency other than counsel’s initial concerns 
that were ultimately resolved by the competency evaluations.  Has Defendant 
shown that his counsel was ineffective for stipulating to his competency after 
both evaluators unequivocally found him competent? 
 2.  In an affidavit filed in support of a rule 23B motion for remand, trial 
counsel reasserts and expands upon his initial concerns about Defendant’s 
competency.  Absent a remand under rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, can Defendant show that his counsel was ineffective for not 
consulting with one of his competency evaluators? 
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 Standard of Review for Issues 1 & 2.  Ineffective-assistance-of-counsel 
claims raised for the first time on appeal are questions of law reviewed de 
novo.  State v. King, 2018 UT App 190, ¶11, 875 Utah Adv. Rep. 13. 
 3.  Does the cumulative error doctrine entitle Defendant to relief? 
 Standard of Review.  None applies. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Summary of facts. 
 Around 1:30 a.m. on a June morning, Ramon Guzman and his friend 
were walking along an Ogden street when someone started yelling insults at 
them from an apartment window.  R768-71,777,838-40,928-30.  Guzman 
responded that if the people in the apartment had “a problem” they should 
“come down here.”  R929-30.  They accepted his challenge.  R768-69,930-31.   
 Three men came out to the street and continued yelling at Guzman and 
his friend.  R768-71,930-31.  After someone yelled “bring it over here mother 
f----,” the three men, one armed with a handgun, sprinted across the street 
towards Guzman and his friend, who each drew a knife.  R768-72,930-32, 
807,811-12.  But before a physical fight could begin, four gunshots rang out.  
R772,807,811-12.  Although all four bullets hit Guzman, he survived.  
R840,847-48.   
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 After the shooting, the three men ran back towards the apartment 
building they had come from.  R773-74.  Mike Martinez rented the apartment.  
R1124-25.  Defendant and several others had gathered there that night, 
including Defendant’s “homies” Isaiah Moncada and Luis Lara.  R865-
68;SE#64 at 10:35-10:50. 
 Police responded and found Moncada and Lara in the apartment.  
R865-68.  They each matched an eyewitness’s description of two of the men 
who had been involved in the shooting.  R868,903-04.   
 Eyewitnesses further noted that two of the three men were tall, but the 
third—who was between the two and directly in front of Guzman—was 
“dramatically shorter.”  R770,808.  Defendant was three inches shorter than 
Moncada and Lara.  R869-70. 
 Additional evidence identified Defendant as the shooter.  Guzman got 
a good look at his shooter’s face and later picked Defendant’s photo from a 
lineup when asked to identify who shot him.  R845,880.  In fact, when 
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Guzman saw Defendant’s photo he “ripped” it from the detective’s hand and 
exclaimed, “That’s him.”1  R880. 
 Police found a loaded and cocked .22 caliber handgun behind a 
building near the apartment building.  R718-18; State’s Exhibits (SE) #35-40.  
Defendant left his fingerprints on that gun’s magazine.  R872-73,1045,1071.  
Police also recovered three of the four shell casings, all of which were fired 
from that gun.  R706-07,755,957. 
 It took police two and a-half weeks to find and arrest Defendant.  R881-
82,920-21.  A detective interviewed him at the police station.  R886-87;SE#64.  
Defendant admitted that on the night of the shooting he and his girlfriend 
were with his “homies” Isaiah Moncada and Luis Lara in the apartment near 
the shooting, and that he had walked through the area where police found 
the handgun.  R891;SE#64 at 10:35-10:50; 27:00-27:50.   
 But Defendant claimed that he and his girlfriend did not leave the 
apartment until after the gunshots.  SE#64 at 10:50-11:05; 13:00-14:35.  When 
                                              
1  Guzman’s friend identified Luis Lara from a photo lineup.  R947-
48,1003-06.  The friend told police that he “was almost 100% sure” the person 
he identified was the shooter.  R1005-06.  But the friend later explained that 
he had been more focused on the person who was in front of him, and not on 
the shooter.  R933-34,942-43. 
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the detective told Defendant that his fingerprints were on the gun, Defendant 
first claimed that he had never seen or touched the gun, but later said that 
someone had pulled it on him two days before the shooting.  SE#64 at 28:00-
30:35. 
 At trial, Defendant’s girlfriend admitted that she and Defendant were 
at the apartment on the night of the shooting.  R1091-92.  But in contrast to 
Defendant’s claim to police that he had never touched the gun, his girlfriend 
testified that she saw Defendant and others in the apartment passing the gun 
around that night. R1091-92,1114.  She admitted that she never told this to 
police even though she knew Defendant had been charged with attempted 
murder.  R1117-18.   
 Mike Martinez, who rented the apartment where people had gathered 
the night of the shooting, testified that Defendant, Moncada, and Lara were 
at his apartment that night, but he did not remember seeing Defendant’s 
girlfriend.  R1124-28.  Martinez did not see anyone displaying a gun or 
passing one around that evening, but he was not in the living room with his 
guests the entire time they were there.  R1131,1136.  Martinez remembered 
that he heard gunshots outside after Defendant, Lara, and Moncada left his 
apartment.  R1129-30. 
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B. Procedural history. 
 The State charged Defendant with one count each of attempted murder 
and felony discharge of a firearm with serious bodily injury, both first-degree 
felonies, and one count of possession of a firearm by a restricted person, a 
second-degree felony.  R1. 
 Before trial, defense counsel asked the trial court to evaluate 
Defendant’s competency.  R34-37.  Counsel asserted that after conversing 
with Defendant during “the past several court hearings,” Defendant did “not 
appear to be able to comprehend what [was] going on” or to “make rational 
decisions regarding his case.”  R37. 
Both evaluators find Defendant competent 
 The trial court appointed two evaluators—Drs. Hawks and 
Wilkinson—who examined Defendant and both found him competent.  R41-








     
 
 
 At the competency hearing, defense counsel stipulated that Defendant 
was competent “based on those two reports.”  R378. 
 On the first day of trial, the prosecution dismissed the felony discharge 
of a firearm count.  R597.  The parties also agreed to bifurcate the possession 
of a firearm count.  R598,1250-61.    
 The jury convicted Defendant of attempted murder.  R172.  Defendant 
then pled guilty to possessing a firearm as a restricted person.  R134-
40;R1251-60. 
Both counsel and Defendant certify that he is competent to plead guilty 
 In conjunction with his guilty plea, Defendant signed an affidavit 
certifying that he believed himself to be “free of any mental disease, defect, 
or impairment that would prevent [him] from understanding what [he was] 
doing or from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering [his] plea.”  
R179.  He also certified that he had read the statement, or had it read to him, 
understood its contents, and adopted each of its statements.  R179.  Trial 
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counsel certified that he had discussed the plea affidavit with Defendant and 
that counsel believed that Defendant “fully understands the meaning of its 
contents and is mentally and physically competent.”  R180. 
 During the plea colloquy, Defendant cogently responded to all the 
court’s questions.  R1253-58.  He told the court that he understood what was 
happening and that his attorney had explained everything to him.  R1257.  
After observing and questioning Defendant, the court stated, “[Y]ou seem to 
me like you’re comprehending and understanding what we’re doing here.”  
R1257. 
 The trial court sentenced Defendant to concurrent prison terms of three 
years to life for attempted murder and one to fifteen years for possessing a 
firearm as a restricted person.  R339-40.  The court also ordered the sentences 
to run concurrently with sentences Defendant was serving in two other cases.  
R340. 
 Defendant timely appealed.  R341. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 I.  Defendant claims that his counsel was ineffective for stipulating to 
his competency after two evaluations resolved his counsel’s concerns about 
his mental state and found Defendant competent.  Defendant cannot carry 
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his burden to show that his counsel was ineffective because he offers no 
evidence of prejudice—a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s 
stipulation, there is a reasonable probability the court would have found him 
incompetent.  Both evaluators unequivocally found Defendant to be 
competent, thus resolving counsel’s initial concerns.  Defendant also 
demonstrated his competence during his police interview and plea colloquy.  
There is no evidence that Defendant was incompetent. 
 Defendant also cannot demonstrate deficient performance—that his 
counsel’s decision to stipulate was objectively unreasonable.  Defendant 
claims that all he must show to prove deficient performance is that there was 
no conceivable tactical basis for his counsel to stipulate to Defendant’s 
competency.  This Court’s case law supports that position.  But both this 
Court and Defendant misunderstand the deficient performance standard.  
Deficient performance is measured by whether counsel’s performance is 
objectively reasonable, not by whether it is good strategy.  Although Utah 
law may not be clear on this point, United States Supreme Court case law is.  
It controls. 
 Defendant cannot show deficient performance because reasonable 
counsel could decide to stipulate to Defendant’s competency where two 
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evaluations unanimously and unequivocally resolved counsel’s initial 
concerns about Defendant’s mental state and Defendant demonstrated his 
competency during his police interview and plea colloquy.   
 During his police interview, Defendant demonstrated a rational and 
factual understand of the criminal proceedings and possible punishments.  
He also demonstrated the ability to converse about the charges and evidence 
with a reasonable degree of rational understanding.  He articulated and 
consistently maintained a coherent defense, despite the officer’s insistence 
that the evidence all pointed to him.  Both Defendant and his counsel also 
certified that Defendant was competent when he entered his guilty plea. 
 Although Defendant challenges both of his convictions in this appeal, 
his guilty plea waived all non-jurisdictional defects in his firearm-possession 
conviction.  Defendant can therefore challenge only his attempted murder 
conviction in this appeal. 
 II.  Defendant also claims that his counsel was ineffective for not 
consulting with one of the evaluators—Dr. Hawks.  He claims that if counsel 
had shared his additional observations about Defendant’s mental state with 
Dr. Hawks, there is a reasonable probability that the trial court would have 
found Defendant incompetent.  Defendant includes his counsel’s additional 
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observations in an affidavit and seeks a rule 23B remand to include these 
observations in the appellate record.  Because this claim depends on extra-
record evidence, this Court cannot grant relief absent a rule 23B remand.  This 
Court should not grant a remand for the reasons stated in the accompanying 
response to Defendant’s remand motion. 
 III.  Defendant argues that the cumulative-error doctrine entitles him 
to relief.  But that doctrine is inapplicable for two reasons.  First, had 
Defendant proven a reasonable probability that he was incompetent, he 
would have been entitled to relief without any additional prejudice showing.   




Counsel was not ineffective for stipulating to Defendant’s 
competency because there is no evidence that Defendant was 
incompetent; competency evaluations resolved counsel’s 
initial concerns and Defendant further demonstrated his 
competency during his police interview and plea colloquy. 
 Defendant argues that his counsel was ineffective for stipulating to 
Defendant’s competency after counsel had requested a competency 
evaluation based on concerns that Defendant allegedly could not understand 
the proceedings or make rational decisions.  Br.Aplt.11-16.  Defendant argues 
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that counsel should not have stipulated to Defendant’s competency because 
the “psychologists’ reports confirmed trial counsel’s observations” and “no 
sound trial strategy … includes sending a cognitively impaired client to stand 
trial.”  Br.Aplt.12-13.  Defendant argues that he suffered prejudice because 
“the trial court relied on [the stipulation] instead of conducting its own 
review” of Defendant’s competency.  Br.Aplt.14 (bolding omitted). 
 Defendant cannot carry his heavy burden to show that his counsel was 
ineffective because he offers no evidence of prejudice—a reasonable 
probability that he was incompetent.  Moreover, Defendant cannot prove that 
his counsel was deficient because reasonable counsel could decide to 
stipulate to Defendant’s competency given Defendant’s demonstrated 
abilities during his police interview, competency evaluations, and plea 
colloquy. 
A. Defendant cannot show prejudice because he offers no 
evidence that he was incompetent at all. 
 To show that his counsel was ineffective, Defendant must prove that 
(1) his counsel performed deficiently, and (2) he was prejudiced as a result.  
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-89, 694 (1984).  To prove that he 
suffered Strickland prejudice, Defendant must prove that there is “a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result 
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of the proceeding would have been different.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.  
Thus, to prove prejudice in the context of a competency issue, a defendant 
must show a reasonable probability that but for his counsel’s deficient 
performance, the defendant “would have been found incompetent.”  State v. 
Biebinger, 2018 UT App 123, ¶16, 428 P.3d 36; accord, Taylor v. State, 2007 UT 
12, ¶95, 156 P.3d 739 (rejecting ineffective-assistance claim in part because 
defendant “has not shown that, had a competency hearing been requested 
and granted, the court would have found evidence of incompetence”). 
 Defendant cannot prove prejudice because there is no evidence of a 
reasonable probability that the trial court would have found him to be 
incompetent absent his counsel’s stipulation.  Though counsel alleged that 
Defendant seemed to be unable to understand the proceedings and make 
rational decisions, two independent psychologists concluded otherwise after 
complete competency evaluations.  R41-48,53-65.  Both evaluators 
unequivocally concluded that Defendant was competent.  R55,47.  The 
evaluations conclusively dispelled any concerns about Defendant’s 
competency, whether from his counsel or some other source. 
 Moreover, both counsel and Defendant later certified that Defendant 
was competent during the plea colloquy on the bifurcated charge on the last 
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day of trial.  R179-80.  And the trial court noted that Defendant appeared 
competent based on the court’s observations throughout trial and his 
interaction with Defendant in particular during the plea colloquy.  R1257.  
 Defendant therefore points to no evidence that would show that, but 
for his counsel’s stipulation, there is a reasonable probability that the trial 
court would have found him incompetent.  To the contrary, all the evidence 
shows that he was competent.  He therefore has not proven prejudice.  See 
Biebinger, 2018 UT App 123, ¶16. 
B. Defendant cannot show deficient performance because he 
misunderstands, and thus fails to satisfy, Strickland’s deficient 
performance standard. 
 Relying on State v. Jamieson, 2017 UT App 236, ¶32, 414 P.3d 559, cert. 
granted 421 P.3d 439, Defendant argues that he can show that his counsel 
performed deficiently merely by demonstrating “‘that there was no 
conceivable tactical basis for counsel’s actions.’”  Br.Aplt.12 (quoting 
Jamieson, 2017 UT App 236, ¶32).  Defendant is incorrect.  Although a footnote 
in Jamieson supports Defendant’s argument, both Defendant and Jamieson 
misunderstand Strickland’s deficient performance element. 
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1. Strickland’s deficient performance standard requires 
Defendant to prove that his counsel’s performance was 
objectively unreasonable, not merely that it lacked a 
conceivable tactical basis. 
 To show that his counsel performed deficiently, Defendant must show 
more than that there was no conceivable tactical basis for his counsel’s 
actions.  Strickland measures deficient performance by whether counsel’s 
performance “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.”  466 U.S. 
at 688.  Thus, the determinative question “is not whether counsel’s choices 
were strategic, but whether they were reasonable.”  Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 
U.S. 470, 481 (2000).   
 An evaluation of possible strategic reasons for counsel’s decisions is 
relevant to a Strickland deficient-performance analysis, but it is not 
dispositive.  Possible strategic explanations are relevant because Strickland 
recognizes that “[t]here are countless ways to provide effective assistance in 
any given case. Even the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a 
particular client in the same way.”  466 U.S. at 689.  Thus, to ensure counsel 
the flexibility to defend their clients in the way they believe is most effective, 
the Strickland standard “strongly presume[s]” that counsel “made all 




 Given this presumption, when conceivable tactical bases support trial 
counsel’s actions, a defendant has not rebutted the strong presumption that 
his counsel performed reasonably.  See State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, ¶7, 89 P.3d 
162 (explaining that defendant claiming ineffective assistance must show that 
“there was no conceivable tactical basis for counsel’s actions”) (cleaned up) 
(emphasis in original).  The Strickland presumption of a sound strategy thus 
can be dispositive, but only of a finding of effective performance, not deficient 
performance.   
 The lack of a considered strategic basis for counsel’s performance does 
not automatically render his performance objectively unreasonable.  See 
Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 481.  Even when a considered strategic reason for 
counsel’s performance seems elusive, a defendant still cannot carry his 
burden of proving deficient performance unless he can show that his 
counsel’s performance “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88.  Counsel’s performance is not deficient merely 
because a reviewing court cannot conceive of a tactical basis for counsel’s 
performance. 
 This is because the Strickland standard further recognizes that counsel 
cannot possibly be expected to have a strategic reason for his every act or 
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omission.  The purpose of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel “is not to 
improve the quality of legal representation.’”  Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 481 
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689).  Rather, it is “‘simply to ensure that 
criminal defendants receive a fair trial.’” Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
689).  “Just as there is no expectation that competent counsel will be a flawless 
strategist or tactician, an attorney may not be faulted for a reasonable 
miscalculation or lack of foresight or for failing to prepare for what appear to 
be remote possibilities.”  Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 110 (2011).  
Counsel performs deficiently only when overlooking an issue is “‘sufficiently 
egregious and prejudicial,’” id. at 111 (citation omitted), that “no competent 
attorney” would have missed it, Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 115, 124 (2011). 
 The Sixth Amendment therefore recognizes that counsel may “focus[] 
on some issues to the exclusion of others.”  Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 8 
(2003).  When that occurs, “there is a strong presumption that [counsel] did 
so for tactical reasons rather than through sheer neglect.”  Id.  “The Sixth 
Amendment,” therefore, “guarantees reasonable competence, not perfect 
advocacy judged with the benefit of hindsight.”  Id.; accord Burt v. Titlow, 571 
U.S. 12, 24 (2013); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.   
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 Thus, to prove deficient performance, a defendant must do more than 
merely rebut the strong presumption that “under the circumstances, the 
challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.” Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 689 (cleaned up).  A defendant must ultimately prove that his 
counsel’s performance “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.”  
Strickland 466 U.S. at 688; Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 481.   
 The Supreme Court has distilled the rule to this:  counsel’s 
representation is objectively reasonable, and therefore constitutionally 
compliant, unless “no competent attorney” would have proceeded as he did.  
Premo, 562 U.S. at 124. 
 The State made this argument in Jamieson and this Court rejected it in 
a footnote, asserting that the argument was “not supported by [Utah] case 
law.”  2017 UT App 236, ¶37 n.7.  But “the standard of proof for claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel … is a matter of federal law, on which [Utah 
Court’s] are bound to follow Supreme Court precedent.”  State v. Sessions, 
2014 UT 44, ¶37, 342 P.3d 738).  The above-cited case law demonstrates that 
Strickland’s deficient-performance prong require a defendant to prove 
objectively unreasonable performance, not the mere absence of a conceivable 
tactical basis for counsel’s action. 
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2. Defendant has not shown that counsel’s stipulation that 
Defendant was competent was objectively unreasonable 
where all evidence demonstrated that Defendant was 
competent. 
 Reasonable counsel could decide to stipulate to Defendant’s 
competency because all the evidence showed that Defendant was competent.  
The competency evaluations resolved counsel’s earlier concerns about 
Defendant’s competency and there is no other evidence that Defendant was 
incompetent. 
 When Defendant committed his crimes, the Utah Code provided that: 
a person is incompetent to proceed if he is suffering from a 
mental disorder or mental retardation resulting either in: 
 
(1) his inability to have a rational and factual understanding of 
the proceedings against him or of the punishment specified for 
the offense charged; or 
 
(2) his inability to consult with his counsel and to participate in 
the proceedings against him with a reasonable degree of rational 
understanding. 
 
Utah Code Ann. §77-15-2 (2017). 
 
 There is no evidence that Defendant met this standard.  Rather, all the 
evidence showed that Defendant was competent:  two psychologists found 
that he was and his statements to both police and to the trial court further 
demonstrated that he was. 
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 Evaluations.   
 
 
     
 











            











     
 




   


























































 Police Interview.  Defendant also demonstrated his competency 
during his police interview.  During that interview, Defendant was able to 
coherently describe a defense.  He claimed that although he was in the 
apartment where others involved were later located, Defendant said that he 
was kissing his girlfriend in the bathroom when he heard gunshots and that 
he left the apartment only after the gunshots.  SE#64 at 10:50-11:05;13:00-
14:35.  Defendant was able to recall and relate what he did in the hours and 
minutes both before and after the shooting.  SE#64 at 7:08-14:35. 
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 Defendant also demonstrated the ability to understand the significance 
of the evidence against him.  When the Detective said that Defendant’s 
fingerprints were on the gun, Defendant first claimed that he had never seen 
the gun, but later claimed that someone had pulled that gun on him two days 
before the shooting.  SE#64 at 28:00-29:35.  He maintained that he had never 
touched the gun.  SE#64 at 30:20-30:35.  Towards the end of the recorded 
interview, the detective left the room while Defendant called his mother on 
the detective’s phone.  SE#64 at 32:00-41:00.  Defendant showed that he 
comprehended the significance of the evidence against him when he told his 
mother “They have all this s---.  All this s---.  Even though I—even though it 
wasn’t me you know how many people that they got f----n tellin’.”  SE#64 at 
34:20-34:40. 
 Defendant was also able to logically explain why the police should not 
suspect him.  He reasoned that if he were guilty, he would have fled rather 
than stay in Utah where the police could find him. SE#64 at 5:45-6:55;17:30-
18:00.  He explained that it would be “just dumb” to shoot someone and not 
flee and asked “Why would I do some stupid s--- like that?”  SE#64 at 12:30-
12:55.  He reminded the officer that he did not flee or hide.  SE#64 at 12:46-
12:55.  Defendant later added that he was “a straight-up person” who would 
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confess if he were guilty.  SE#64 at 17:30-18:00.  He then explained what he 
would have done if he were guilty.  He told the detective, “I wouldn’t even 
be here right now, I wouldn’t even be in Utah…. That is stupid to stay out 
here if I did do some stuff like this.”  SE#64 at 17:30-18:00. 
 Defendant was also able to offer a reasoned explanation for his inability 
to recall the names of anyone else in the apartment besides Isaiah Moncada 
and Luis Lara.  The detective insisted that Defendant must have at least 
known the others’ names because he would have introduced himself to 
people he did not know.  SE#64 at 15:00-17:20.  Defendant maintained that he 
did not know any of the others’ names and explained he was not the kind of 
person who introduced himself to others or who wanted to make friends.  
SE#64 at 16:45-17:20. 
 Defendant consistently maintained his innocence, despite the 
detective’s persistence, including telling Defendant that the victim had 
identified him and that his fingerprints were on the gun.  SE#64 at 5:45-31:15. 
 Plea Colloquy.  Finally, Defendant also demonstrated his competency 
when he pled guilty to the bifurcated possession of a firearm charge.  R134-
40;R1251-60.  As part of that plea, Defendant certified in a plea affidavit that 
he believed himself “to be of sound and discerning mind” and “mentally 
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capable of understanding these proceedings and the consequences of [his] 
plea.”  R179.  He further certified that he was “free of any mental disease, 
defect, or impairment that would prevent [him] from understanding what 
[he was] doing or from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering 
[his] plea.”  R179.  His counsel also certified that he had discussed the plea 
affidavit with Defendant and that counsel believed Defendant “fully 
understands the meaning of its contents and is mentally and physically 
competent.”  R180.  Utah courts have relied on a defendant’s and his counsel’s 
representations during a plea colloquy, and the defendant’s demonstrated 
abilities during the colloquy, as evidence of competency.  See Helbach v. State, 
2009 UT App 375U, ¶4; Ellis v. State, 2014 UT 50, ¶4, 321 P.3d 1174; York v. 
Shulsen, 875 P.2d 590 (Utah App. 1994). 
 Defendant’s two competency evaluations, his police interview, and his 
plea colloquy all demonstrated that he had a rational and factual understand 
of both the criminal proceedings against him and the specified punishments 
for his crimes.  See Utah Code. Ann. §77-15-5(2).  This evidence also 
demonstrated that Defendant had the ability to consult with his counsel with 
a reasonable degree of rational understanding.  See id.  In short, it conclusively 
demonstrated Defendant’s competence. 
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 Given this evidence, reasonable counsel could decide to stipulate to 
Defendant’s competency.  Reliance on mental-health “experts’ unanimous 
conclusion” that a defendant is competent is “a reasonable exercise of 
professional judgment.”  Jacobs v. State, 2001 UT 17, ¶23, 20 P.3d 382.  Here, 
not only did the psychologists unanimously agree that Defendant was 
competent, Defendant demonstrated his competence during his police 
interview and plea colloquy.  Counsel’s stipulation therefore did not 
constitute deficient performance.  See id. 
3. The evaluations dispelled trial counsel’s initial concerns 
about Defendant’s competency. 
 Defendant argues that the competency evaluations “confirmed” trial 
counsel’s initial concerns about Defendant’s competency:  that Defendant did 
“‘not appear to be able to comprehend what is going on[, o]r make rational 
decisions regarding this case.’”  Br.Aplt.12 (quoting R37).  Defendant relies 
on two aspects of the evaluations to support this assertion.  He first states that 
  
Br.Aplt.12-13.  Defendant also relies on an isolated sentence from the 




          
























     
 
  
  See United States v. Bell, 280 Fed. Appx. 
548, 550 (7th Cir. 2008).  “[A] low IQ score alone is not enough to show that a 
defendant is incompetent.”  Id.  Indeed, as noted, even though Dr. Hawks 
concluded that  
 
 
 Second, the “not” in Dr. Wilkinson’s summary statement is most 
reasonably read to be a typographical error.  R41.   
 
 
















   
  
 
     
 
 











 In short, the evaluations resolved any concerns about Defendant’s 
competency and his police interview and plea colloquy further supported the 
evaluators’ conclusions that he was competent.  No evidence in the record 
shows otherwise.  Counsel therefore reasonably decided to stipulate to 
Defendant’s competency. 
C. Defendant’s guilty plea waived any challenge to his conviction 
for possessing a firearm as a restricted person. 
 Defendant purports to challenge in this appeal his convictions for both 
attempted murder and possession of a firearm by a restricted person.  
Br.Aplt.2,26.  He does not differentiate between his convictions anywhere in 
his brief.  Br.Aplt.1-26. 
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 But Defendant cannot now challenge his firearm-possession conviction 
because he pled guilty to that charge.  R134-40;R1251-60.  “‘The general rule 
applicable in criminal proceedings, and the cases are legion, is that by 
pleading guilty, the defendant is deemed to have admitted all of the essential 
elements of the crime charged and thereby waives all nonjurisdictional 
defects, including alleged pre-plea constitutional violations.’” State v. 
Rhinehart, 2007 UT 61, ¶15, 167 P.3d 1046 (quoting State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 
1275, 1278 (Utah 1989)). 
 Defendant’s guilty plea both explicitly and implicitly waived any 
challenge to his firearm-possession conviction.  The plea explicitly waived 
any challenge to this conviction based on alleged incompetency when, as 
mentioned, both Defendant and his counsel certified during the plea colloquy 
that Defendant was competent to plead guilty.  R179,180.  And even without 
these certifications, the guilty plea implicitly waived all nonjurisdictional 
defects in this conviction.  See Rhinehart, 2007 UT 61, ¶15.  Defendant therefore 




Defendant cannot show that his counsel was ineffective for not 
consulting with one of the evaluators because this claim 
depends on extra-record evidence. 
 Defendant argues that his counsel was ineffective because counsel did 
not consult with one of the evaluators, Dr. Hawks, before he completed his 
evaluation.  Br.Aplt.16.  Defendant asserts that his counsel had additional 
concerns and observations about Defendant’s competency but failed to share 
them with Dr. Hawks.  Br.Aplt.17-20.  Defendant argues that his counsel 
performed deficiently because there was “no conceivable tactical basis” not 
to discuss counsel’s concerns with Dr. Hawks.  Br.Aplt.17.  Defendant 
contends that he suffered prejudice because he reasons that his counsel’s 
observations, coupled with Defendant’s mentally retardation, “would have 
led the court to conclude that [Defendant] was incompetent.”  Br.Aplt.20. 
 Defendant cannot prove that his counsel was ineffective in this regard 
because trial counsel’s alleged additional concerns and observations about 
Defendant’s competency are not part of the record.  Rather, they are listed in 
a short affidavit that Defendant references and attaches to his brief.  
Br.Aplt.18-20,Addendum D.  Defendant seeks a rule 23B remand to include 
counsel’s additional observations in the record.  Br.Aplt.18. 
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 Absent a rule 23B remand, Defendant cannot prove that his counsel 
was ineffective.  To prove an ineffectiveness claim, Defendant must “point[] 
to specific instances in the record demonstrating both counsel’s deficient 
performance and the prejudice it caused [him].”  State v. Griffin, 2015 UT 18, 
¶16, __ P.3d __.  Because this claim depends on extra-record evidence, this 
Court cannot hold that Defendant’s counsel was ineffective absent a remand.2  
See id. 
III. 
The cumulative error doctrine is inapplicable because a single 
prejudicial error would entitle Defendant to relief and, in any 
event, Defendant has shown no error. 
 Defendant argues that if the errors he has alleged are not sufficiently 
prejudicial on their own, they are sufficiently prejudicial together.  
Br.Aplt.22-26.  The cumulative-error doctrine applies only when “the 
                                              
 2  This Court should strike counsel’s affidavit, contained in Defendant’s 
Addendum D, and all references to it in Defendant’s brief.  This Court will 
“‘consider [evidence] supporting Rule 23B motions solely to determine the 
propriety of remanding ineffective assistance of counsel claims for 
evidentiary hearings.’”  Id. (quoting State v. Bredehoft, 966 P.2d 285, 290 (Utah 
App.1998)).  A party cannot supplement the appellate record “by simply 
including the omitted material in the party’s addendum.”  State v. Pliego, 1999 
UT 8, ¶ 7, 974 P.2d 279.  Defendant’s Addendum D and all references thereto 




cumulative effect of the several errors undermines [this Court’s confidence] 
... that a fair trial was had.”  State v. Martinez-Castellanos, 2018 UT 46, ¶39, 872 
Utah Adv. Rep. 51 (quotation and citation omitted).  Only errors that are 
“substantial” enough to have some “conceivable potential for harm” can 
accumulate into reversible error.  Id. ¶¶40-42. 
 The cumulative error doctrine is inapplicable here for two reasons.  
First, proof of prejudice on either of Defendant’s claims would entitle him to 
relief.  As explained, to prove prejudice, Defendant must prove that there is 
a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s allegedly deficient 
performance, there is a reasonable probability that he would have been found 
incompetent.  See State v. Biebinger, 2018 UT App 123, ¶16, 428 P.3d 36.  That 
showing alone—had Defendant made it—would justify relief. 
 But even if that showing were somehow insufficient on a single claim, 
Defendant has shown not shown any error at all.  The cumulative-error 
doctrine is therefore inapplicable because there are no errors to accumulate.  
See Martinez-Castellanos, 2018 UT 46, ¶39. 
CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm. 
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 Respectfully submitted on December 5, 2018. 
  SEAN D. REYES 
  Utah Attorney General 
 
/s/ Christopher D. Ballard 
  CHRISTOPHER D. BALLARD 
  Assistant Solicitor General 
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